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TRUTH IN WITTGENSTEIN, 
TRUTH IN LINDBECK 
CRAIG HOVEY 
George Lindbeck is unabashed about the debt he owes to Ludwig Wittgenstein 
concerning his cultural-linguistic theory of religion and the derivative theological 
method. He admits that, "Wittgenstein's influence. . has served as a major stimulus 
to my thinking.'" Nevertheless, Lindbeck rarely makes clear where this stimulus has 
been appropriated. It will be the burden of this essay to demonstrate some ways in 
which Wittgenstein's influence is evident in Lindbeck's theory as explained in his 
book, The Nature of Doctrine. We will begin with a brief sketch of some crucial 
Wittgensteinian points and then see how Lindbeck has attempted to appropriate 
them vis-a-vis the question of religious truth 2 We will then conclude with some 
remarks on how this relates to Lindbeck's ecumenical interests. 
lANGUAGE FOR WIlTGENSTEIN 
Wittgenstein has argued against theories of language based on referentialism. He 
opens his Philosophical investigations with a quotation from St. Augustine's Confessions in 
which Augustine describes that he learned what things were called based on the utter-
ances of his elders and their pointing at the corresponding objects. Over time, he came 
to understand how these utterances were to be strung together into sentences and 
thereby constitute a language. This way of understanding language as referential (that 
is, as making reference to things in reality) became the object of Wittgenstein's critique. 
The problem is not that referentialism is outright false but that it fails to account 
for the variety of functions words serve. This is why he adds, "Augustine does not 
speak of there being any differences between kinds of words."3 To be sure, some 
aspects of language actually do function this way but certainly not all-or even most-
of them. Wittgenstein demonstrated that a purely referential language is quite incon-
ceivable by showing the various functions of words in even a very simple example. 
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I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples. ' He takes the 
slip to the shopkeeper, who opens a drawer marked "apples"; then he looks up the 
word "red" in a table and finds a color sample opposite it; then he says a series of 
cardinal numbers- I assume that he knows them by heart- up to the word "five" 
and for each number he takes an apple of the same color as the sample out of the 
drawer.-It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words· 
So even in this primitive example, it is clear that the three words spoken serve to com-
municate in three different ways. The word "five" has no actual meaning in this instance 
aside from how it is used.5 The word "red" only has meaning insofar as it is used with refer-
ence to the property of an object, apples in this case. The word "apples" is perhaps the only 
purely referential aspect in this instance and even then, the plural form is only as explainable 
as the use of the number five. In addition to the meanings of the individual words, saying 
"five red apples" can function in various ways. It will only be interpreted as a request if it is 
spoken to a shopkeeper and there are preexistent social conventions governing the ways 
shoppers speak to shopkeepers and what they hope will happen when they speak. 
Wittgenstein goes on to show that the Augustinian picture of language is both inade-
quate and inaccurate. First, it is inadequate because it represents a limited view of what 
language is: "Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only 
not everything we call language is this system."6 This was seen in the way that "five' is too 
complex simply to be a word corresponding to an object (even five objects, for that mat-
ter) in reality. Also, people's names are "names' in a different sense than are the names of, 
for example, species. For this reason, pointing at a person and saying "Suzy" names some-
thing different from saying 'woman" or "human."? 
Second, the Augustinian picture is inaccurate on 'naming' because it mistakenly 
assumes that the meaning of an object is the object itself. However, real language use is 
not like that. Words continue to have meaning even after the corresponding object ceases 
to exist. A person's name continues to have meaning even after that person dies. 
Augustine's error was "to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name."s 
In this way, not only is the Augustinian picture an inadequate model for the various uses 
of language but it is also an inaccurate way of representing ·naming. 
It is worth pausing over these first few sections of Philosophical Investigations because, as 
Robert Fogelin has observed, many seeds of Wittgenstein's thought as he develops them 
later in the book are found to germinate here. "Much though not all of the Philosophical 
Investigations can be viewed as an extended elaboration on these themes introduced at 
the very start of his reflections."9 Let us attempt to unpack some of those themes by turn-
ing to the solution he suggests. 
TRUTH FOR WIlTGENSTEIN 
For Wittgenstein, language only takes on meaning when it is part of a 'language game.' 
The rules of the language game are expressed as its grammar which establishes the para-
meters of what can and cannot be expressed intelligibly in a language. These rules are set 
by a given community which uses a language a particular way, which is to say, in ways 
determined by that community's practices. From the above example involving a shop-
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keeper and a customer, the word "five' takes on meaning only because people engage in 
the practice of counting things. Hans Zorn notes that the Wittgensteinian example sen-
tence, 'This room has length" has meaning simply because people measure things. ' 0 
Furthermore, for Wittgenstein, the truth of a proposition has to do with how well it corre-
lates with the "forms of life"" it is meant to describe. Truth claims are mediated within a lan-
guage game by the grammar rules involved so that the claims can be said to be true insofar 
as the rules are followed. So to say, 'This room has length' can be said to be true, not 
because it has been measured and thus shown to be true but simply because there exists 
such a thing as the practice as measurement. A whole language game then can be judged by 
how authentic it is, which is to say, how successful it is at sustaining a form of life. 
This notion of truth as authenticity '2 holds since all truth claims are made linguistically 
and are, therefore, governed by rules of grammar which, in turn, are governed by forms 
of life. According to Wittgenstein, disagreements between people arise not over questions 
regarding the correct use of rules but over the practices to which they are meant to relate. 
"Disputes do not break out ... over the question whether a rule has been obeyed or not . 
. but in forms of life."'l This issue of disputes will be discussed further below with regard 
to Lindbeck's ecumenical intentions. We shall now turn to a discussion of how the pre-
ceding Wittgensteinian ideas are appropriated by Lindbeck. 
From what has been shown of Wittgenstein's position on truth and its rootedness in 
language, it should not be surprising that it appears in the work of theologians and ethi-
cists. These are people who deal regularly with questions of truth and 'forms of life.' 
Lindbeck is one of these theologians who may have taken his cue from Wittgenstein's 
identification of "Theology as grammar."'4 In any case, his indebtedness is clear. Here, we 
shall see that Lindbeck's idea of "intrasystematic truth" owes to Wittgenstein's treatment 
of truth as authenticity. In addition, some comments will be made about the role this 
plays in the former's ecumenical interests. 
TRUTH FOR LINDBECK 
In his development of the cultural-linguistic theory of religion and doctrine, Lindbeck 
picks up on the elements in Wittgenstein sketched above. Specifically, he takes religions to 
be whole language games wherein doctrines are the rules or grammar and religious prac-
tices correspond to forms of life. In the same way that Wittgenstein asserted that grammar 
serves forms of life in languages, so Lindbeck maintains that doctrines serve religious prac-
tices. He notes that, "just as a language (or "language game, to use Wittgenstein's phrase) 
is correlated with a form of life . [a religion'sl doctrines. are integrally related to the 
rituals it practices." 's We can summarize the correlations in the following way: 
Locus: 
Rules : 
Condition: 
Wittgenstein 
Language 
Grammar 
Forms of life 
Lindbeck 
Religion 
Doctrines 
Religious practices 
This relationship goes on to serve Lindbeck's discussion of truth. Given the 
Wittgensteinian influence, it is not surprising that he discusses truth primarily in terms of 
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authenticity. In general, Lindbeck maintains that a proposition is true "to the extent that its 
objectivities are interiorized and exercised by groups and individuals in such a way as to 
conform them in some measure in the various dimensions of their existence to the ulti-
mate reality and goodness that lies at the heart of things."l u He then goes on to distinguish 
between several kinds of truth which comprise this but his most adequate and extensive 
treatment belongs to so-called "intrasystematic truth. 
As noted above, Lindbeck's idea of intrasystematic truth coincides with Wittgenstein's 
truth as authenticity. Lindbeck also calls this "truth of coherence." I? The behavior of the 
speaker must cohere with what is spoken. Notice the indebtedness to Wittgenstein in 
Lindbeck's definition: 
Utterances are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the total relevant 
context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed in cultural-linguistic terms, is 
not only other utterances but also the correlative forms of life.18 
Coherence "with the total relevant context" is but another way of making the 
Wittgensteinian point regarding languages functioning with language games. Lindbeck's 
famous example of a statement which is intrasystematically false is a crusader whose battle 
cry, "Christus est Dominus," is used to sanction the slaying of infidels. 19 However, the same 
utterance may be intrasystematically true when used under different circumstances. In 
other words, insofar as an utterance follows the rules of grammar of the language game, it 
has this kind of truth. 
It is perhaps no great feat to illustrate Lindbeck's use of Wittgenstein's philosophy. 
Afterall, the index of The Nature of Doarine has Wittgenstein ranking third among the 
most referenced people in the book. This is hardly surprising since the book is primarily a 
work of methodology and not theology. However, the present investigation would be 
incomplete without a look at how Lindbeck intends his use of Wittgenstein to be useful 
for theology. 
It is worth addressing the issue of relativism at this point because some have ques-
tioned the usefulness of Wittgenstein for theologians on these grounds.20 Does Lindbeck's 
appropriation of Wittgenstein's account of truth suggest that truth is relative 7 And, if so, 
what is the nature of that relativism7 The easy answer, of course, is that an account of 
truth which depends on the internal consistency of a language system (however con-
ceived) necessarily must admit to a certain degree of relativism. Indeed, such an account 
would seem to lead to so-called absolute (or extreme) relativism which, apart from being 
a self-referentially incoherent concept, would mean that any given language game lacks 
the resources to adjudicate its claim to truth relative to another language game. That this 
kind of relativism seems to be inevitable rests on the assumption that the process of adju-
dication occurs on a theoretical level, that is, abstracted from the embodiment of a partic-
ular language. For Wittgenstein, however, adjudication is but another practice whereby a 
form of life is enfleshed meaning that the idea of neutral ground is illusory. 
This may appear to be a great dodge of the question of relativism or at best an 
approach which allows us to have it both ways, namely, that Wittgenstein's account leads 
to relativism but what is typically meant by relativism is an impossibility. However, for 
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Lindbeck, this is precisely the point where his account of religious truth becomes thickest. 
The very fact that the truth of a religion is bound up with the practices of those who con-
fess that religion is to begin to say more about the truth of that religion than ostensibly 
abstract truth-claims ever could. 
LINDBECK ON ECUMENISM 
Lindbeck begins his book by suggesting that what is new about the cultural-linguistic 
theory he proposes is that "this conceptualization is fruitful for theology and ecu-
menism."21 The rest of the book is a variety of arguments for and demonstrations of this 
claim. He does not actually show that his theory is useful for theology and ecumenism as 
separate points of contention. Rather, he shows that ecumenism is aided by doing and 
understanding theology according to his theory. 
According to Lindbeck, doctrines as rules are best understood as serving a regulative 
function rather than a propositional function. It is true that they have some propositional 
force but only as they express propositions which are based on and condition behavior in 
a given context. The doctrine itself is not the proposition but the contextually determined 
expression of it. This means that changing contexts demand that doctrines be reformulat-
ed according to the same underlying propositions. If this can be done in a way which pro-
duces equivalent results, the new doctrine can be said to be true to the old one. 
Therefore, "One and the same proposition can be expressed in a variety of sentences 
employing a variety of conceptualities."22 Lindbeck notes that Athanasius knew this to be 
the case: "For him, to accept the doctrine [the Nicean Christologyl meant to agree to 
speak a certain way."23 
Notice how this way of understanding doctrine follows from Lindbeck's notion of 
intrasystematic truth and Wittgenstein's truth as authenticity. If the primary way of under-
standing a statement's meaning (as both these ideas of truth do) is in terms of its use, then 
when contention arises between seemingly opposed doctrines, the discussion must 
include references to the corresponding contexts. We have seen that Wittgenstein under-
stands that, "Disputes do not break out over the question whether a rule has been 
obeyed or not ... but in forms of life."24 
Lindbeck is right to claim that this approach holds promise for ecumenism. 'Thus 
oppositions between rules [i.e. doctrinesl can in some cases be resolved, not by altering 
one or both of them, but by specifying when or where they apply, or by stipulating which 
of the competing directives takes precedence."25 So the idea that intrasystematic truth is 
partially contingent on the corresponding forms of life not only is fodder for an ethicist 
("practice what you preach") but also clarifies the task of the theologian.26 He or she must 
distinguish between "doctrine and formulation, between content and form"27 in order to 
identify what can be expressed differently in different contexts while still remaining truth-
ful. Lindbeck hopes that along the way, this approach to theology will encourage worth-
while dialogue. 
CONCLUSION 
George Lindbeck's highly influential treatment of what might constitute a "postliberal" 
method for theology depends significantly on the work of perhaps the first post-modern 
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philosopher. The preceding discussion has been an attempt to explore the meaning of 
Wittgenstein's account of truth as authenticity and its relationship to Lindbeck's concept 
of intrasystematic truth in his book, The Nature of Doctrine. In addition, it has been shown 
how this relationship can be traced directly to Lindbeck's interest in ecumenicism. 
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